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Abstract 
This papcr argues that what led 10 the As ian financial crisis W3 <; a f' llal combination of sev. 
eral self-reinforcing facto rs including ex ternal sector weaknesses. frdgility in domestic financial 
nurkets duc.lo inadequately admini,tcred financiall iberalisalion. 10<;5 of confidence. and shon-Ienn 
Cllp11a1 nows. maturing within I e..~ than a year and denominated in unhedged dollars. Some of 
~ factors .... ere counLry-specific while o ther.> were common to the e nti re region. 
Asia's financial crisis will almoo;t cenainly lead to imponant c hanges in the international fi · 
nancial system. as countries Lry to find an appropriate balance between the benefits from gaining 
access to international capiLaI flows and the potential for inslability and other risks that al.so seem to 
be much greater in a world of large and highly mobi le capital moveme nt. The paper discusses im-
portant lessons from the crisis. 
t. INTRODUCTION 
What Staned in the summer of 1997 as a regional economic and financial crisis in Emit Asia 
had ~\e~ into a global financial erisi .. within the span of a year. 8 y August 1998. Japan was 
In the grip of a serious recession "ith concerns thai failure to pursue adequate banking and finan-
cial reforms may lead to a further depreciation of the yen. Russia was also in serious economic 
trouble following the collapse of the ruble. The crisis in Russia led to a rapid contagion in Lat in 
America with the c urrencies in Brazil, Ve nezuela and sc\'eral other countries coming under specu-
lati ve: pressure. This contagion also affcclf ... d the capital marke ts in the United States and 
Europe, The los~ suffe red by the financial institutions in Russia and emerging markets and the 
nc:arcollapse of the hedge fund. Long Tenn Capital Management. led to a severe liquidity squeeze 
in U. S. capital markets. By September 1998. the risks of a global recession had significanlly in-
86 
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creased. The conditions in the imemational financial markets. howe\'cr, imprO\w substantiallv III 
October and November following three separate interest rJte cuts by the Federal Reset\'e Bank In 
the United Stales. 
The financial crisis in Asia is the third major crisis during the last decade. It follo .... ed tbecn-
sis in the European Monetary System in 1992-93 and the Mexican peso crisis in 1994-95. Hen.. 
ever, unlike the previous two crises. Ihe scale and depth of the Asian crisis have surprised ertf)'. 
one. One obvious reason fo r this is East and Southeast Asia's trJCk record of ttOOOmic SIIe-
cess. Since the 1960s. no o ther group of countries in the world has produced more rapid ttonorruc 
growth or such a dramatic reduction in poveny. In Indonesia. Malaysia, and Thailand a\mge in. 
come more than quadrupled between 1965-96, a nd in Korea, income rme seven times f&eTabJes 
I and 21. This region aHrJcted almost half of t01U1 private capital inflows to developing COllnlrJes.-
.$ 100 billion in 1996. 
(Table 1) Average Annual Percentage Growth in GOP 
GDP Growth Ra te 
1996 GDP ~ Annual 
Per Hcud Average Country (al PPP $) 1970-96 1994 
' 995 '996 China 3.t20 
' .1 12.66 10.5' ,-" HOOIl Kong 25.400 
" 
5.51 J 8l 5.03 Indonr$ia 4.280 6.' ". 8.22 7.98 Mallysia 9.703 , .. 9.24 , ... 8.58 Philippines J.060 J.6 4 311 4n S.76 SIngapore 25.650 
' .2 10.0' 8.7' 132 Soulh Kena 12.410 •• 8.S8 
." 7.10 T.I .... an 17.720 
' .J 6" 6.03 ' .67 Thailand 8.370 ,., •. " ." 552 
Souin': The World Bank, IMF (I998). 
(Table 2) GOP Per Person (annual average percentage change. 1965-96) By Region 
Ease Asil 
Riel! IDdustrial Coumn~ 
SotUh Asia 
Lalin America 
Arm. 
Middlr East 
Source: The World BlUIlt. 
5. 53~ 
2.24 
2.23 
1.06 
-0.24 
·1 .3() 
'997 
.... 
5.29 
.. ., 
7.81 
5.10 
", 
S.41 
... 
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Given so many years of sustained econo' no 
events in Asia unfold as th d'? mlc pc Oonanee. ~e obvious question is: how could 
. '. ey Id . True. there were SOme skeptiCS who regarded the claims of an 
ASian economic miracle as overstate<! and argued Ih t th th 
of labour and ca ital ralher . a e grow was based on an accelerated usc 
( 1995). Frankel ~nd Rose (l:;;).o~~~ (~t;:;6rp)IIIO~ of new(''''I n!!~OIOgy [Krugman ( 1994). Young 
f '. . rugman 77't) suggested thai by the 1990s.lhe pace 0 the regIOn s growth was likely to slow as d ' " hi ' . . 
say that even in earl 1997 no . muots ng returns set m. But It would be f:urto 
y body suspected thaI suc h a calamity was remolely possible. although 
-
-all oe""hal 1m oow described as the fuodamcnlal naws ortncsc economies were evident even thcn. 
The main ob~li"c of this paper i .. to explain what Icd 10 Ihe crisis and how iI spread 
thrOIlghoUllhe region and beyond. It willalc;o analyse the Ic.c;sons thai can be learned from this en-
si~ to prevcnt similar e\'cnts frolll reoccurring in Ihc future. 
Although the causes of the Asian currency c risis are romplex. Iwo m;~or competing hypolhe. 
~ and inl~tnlions have emerged from recent analyses of thc crisis. On the onc hand. Radelc! 
and Stehs (19983 and 1998b) have pointed 10 !>uddcn and mostly arbitrary shifts in market expecla-
ltom mel ronfi<koce. i.e .• financial panic. as the major delenninant of the initial financial turmoil. 
Actordlflg to Ihis vie ..... although the macroeconomic performance of some of these countries had 
some \louie POlOtS. t~ e:\leni and dcfNh of thc cnsis was c3used b) thc panic of local and foreign 
UI\eslOfS and lhe wrong policy O!spon~ of the IMF and ()(her international financial agents. On the 
odxr hand. st\'wd studies ICoN!1II (It (II ( 1998). IMF (1998). Krugman ( 19983. 1998b). Noland 
(1998). and Goldstein (1998)1 ha .. e blamed structural factors for triggering the crisis. They argued 
that an tmsustainable dei:line in macroeconomic fundamentals. weaknesses in the financial system. 
coupled ..... ith poor economic policies were at the rOOI of the cri~ls. Financial weaknesses were 
caW!d largely b) the lack of incenthes for effective risk management created by implicit or Clt· 
pl,cit go\tmmtnt gunmntees ag:unst failure. The ensi ... renecled excessive inve.lilment fueled. first. 
by IIItemauon::II speculation that dro\c regional as.~t values to unreali"lic levels. and second. by an 
East Asian vanant of crony capitalism lhnt dirccted mvestment to unproductive ends (Browne et al 
(1998), Krugman (1998c»). 
The distinction betwccn these two competing hypothe!.cs is unponant for policy purposes. 
While the two views are not mutually cxclu'ii\'e. their policy implicmions vary greatly. Was the 
~ Asian cnsis something that was. waiting 10 happen? Or wa~ it something that didn't have 10 
happen? The answers 10 IhCloe que'ilion .. nre relevant not jusl for the fornlUlation of future politic!; 
in the affected economics but also for economies elsewhere that have embarked on the path of Ii-
nancialliberohsalion. 
This paper will take an iOlcnncdiate view and argue thai wh:tl led 10 this crisis was a flltal 
combinalKKl of se .. eral self.TCinforcing foctoTS including external sector weaknesses. frogility in do-
mestiC filWlClai markets due 10 inadequately administered financial libcralisation and shon-tenn 
capllal flows. m3lunng within les.s than a year and dcnominnled in unhcdged dollars. Some of 
these fac10rs were country-specific ..... hile others were common to the entire region. 
By the mid· I 99Os, sc\ernl countricc; in A~ia - usi ng Japan 's model uf high savings. cJo~ co-
opcrntion of the government and the private scctor, high level of education. and export - onemcd 
growth _ had tr ... n .. fonned themselves from underdeveloped Siaies 10 indu slrial giams. Hong Kong. 
Indonesia. Malaysia, Singapore. South Korea ( Korea, hereafter), Taiwan. and T~ail;lnd bcca~ne 
models for other de .. elopins countncs to emulate. But while the model was. effiCient at cn~eh l.ng 
the industrial giants in the West. It also led 10 a large number of weaknesses In these counln~c; in-
cluding, but not limited to. weaknesses in corporate governance. poor regulatory and sU.JX:~tsory 
aJnngclMnts in the financial sector. a propensity to high indebtcdness and O\cr-lcvernglOg 10 the 
business sector and a lack of transparency at all levels. . Ho~e\er. these- deficiencies were present for many years and didn't pre\'enlthese counln~ 
from auaining high economic growth si nc.:e the 1960s. Hence. they cannOI. by themselves. ~pl~1O 
the crisis. 5e\ ernl common macroeconomic problems across the region can provide some mlssmg 
pieces of the puzzle. . . 
Fir.ot, the high le\e1 of continued growth gave rise to a sense of op~"ms~ about .these c~un. 
mes. In\cstors abroad considered them to be low.risk. well-run economiCS With senSible gmem-
. rbe r t' 0 cd up these mar-
ment budget and predictable exchange rate risks. As financial I r.I ISII Ion pen 
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kets 10 foreign investors. a rapid growth of nct capital inflows look place. Thi Jed to obvious O\'tr. 
heating in some economies as reflected in their large curren! account deficits. Moreover. It10SI of 
the capilal inflows were shon-tenn. unhedged. highly Jc \'craged. and denominated in foreign cur. 
rencies. Due to lax regulatory practices in the financial sectors to these countries. the capital inflotk 
was used mostly to finance speculative investments in the real estate sector in Indonesia, M3l1}sil. 
and Thailand and the industrial sector in Korea. This led 10 excess~apacity. unsustainable in-
creases in real estate prices, and low, even negative. retum<; on tmcstments. MOfCO\'cr. then: was. 
mismatch in the whole process-the local lenders were borrowing shon and lending long. The WIon-
(enn nature of IhecapitaJ in flow made the region vulneruble 10 MY shirl in tffili l conditions. 
Second. the countries in this region. for a1l pmctical purposes. pegged Iheir currtncies to the: 
U. S. dollar. In nominal tenns. the currencies were reasonably sill.ble. Howc\·cr.lhe risk of ol'er· 
heating due to the capital innow in the early 1990s raised questions about the sustain:ability of the 
exchange rate policy. Starting in mid-I995. the dollar rose sharply against the yen. Chen lh3l1a· 
pan is one of the region"s majo r export destinatiOns and also home of key competitOfS and inl'es· 
tors. the region experie nced an erosion of competitiveness in the international mark-a. 1be nSlng 
low-cost exports from China and the emerging bou lenecks in labour markets resulting in high real 
wages in severnl countries also reduced competi ti veness. 
Third, the region gOI caught up in the global wave of financial libe:mliS3tion. HowcI'er, in 
more cases than not. it had not been supported by adequate macroeconomic pollciC!> and suucturaI 
rcfonns. LiberaJisution measures were often partial and incoherent. For example. capital account 
opening in a number of countries allowed banks. but not business enlerprises. to borrow heavily in 
international markets. This led to more libcr.ll movement of short· lemt than long-tenn capi· 
tal. Once the crisis broke. this turned out 10 be a major problcm. 
Fourth, none of the s tructural problems discussed so far can e.xplain the severil)' of the crisis. 
These countries have thrived for years, despite weak financial systems and destabilising elltemal 
evcnts. such as. the oil shocks of the 19705 and the soaring dollar of the early 19805. A big pan of 
the explanation for the severity of the crisis lies with thc ficklenes~ of external inl'e5tM, .... 00 rll'St 
behaved as if these Asian economies could do nothing wrong and. shonJy thereafter. as if !he)' 
could do nothing right. Net private capital nows 10 lndoncsia. Malaysia. the Philippines. Kotta. 
and Thailand jumped from aboul $38 billion in 1994 to S97 bi llion in 1996.10 col lapse to about 
minus S I2 billion in 1997. 
The immediate trigger to the crisis occurred through a number of channels. 1be Federal Re-
serve B~nk. in the United S tales mise<! shon-tenn interest rates in March. 1997. Expecting IJ'I(m 10-
crease~ In. mterest rates in the future. international investors reassessed their prospects in SCleral 
cou~tne~ 10 the region, especially Thailand. Reassessment of growth prospectS in Thail:lnd led to a 
decline In stock prices. As investors looked for alternative investmem instruments, especially in 
bond markets. they realised that the Asian bond markets were too thin to absorb the increased de. 
mand. The resulting ponfolio adjustment led to an outflow of capital from Thailand leading to 
downward pressure on the baht. 
The. Bank of ~ailand initially resisted the speculative pressure by buying baht and selling U. 
S. ~oll~rs m the foreign ~xchange market. Given the low exchange talc risk. many local borrowers 
malntamed an open fore ign exchange POSition. Their cffons to hedge o r close these positions led 10 
further downward. pressure o n Ihe baht. This. in tum. increased the debt burden in tcnns of local 
currcncy. As foreign exchange reserves depleted quickly, the Bank of Thailand was forced to float 
the currency on J~l y. 2, 1997. This led to a large decl ine in the valuc of the baht. 
:ne deprec.I~llOn o f the baht created a do mino effect. As foreign investors reassessed their 
portfoho composLlJon. they focused attention on several other neighbouring countries. They found 
-
-conditions similar to ~~ In Thni!and. notably. their macroeconomic conditions. problems in the ir 
rlfWlClai sectOB. pohllca1 uOCCnlUnly. and the high level of shon-Ienn debt Th ', led . . I to a conla~ 
lion r~~ by exen~ng pressure 00 the currencies in Indonesia. Malaysia. lhe Philippines and other 
counll1CS to the region. Markel" panicked. exchange ratc!> and equi ty markets overshot. a round of 
compditl\'ede ... alu~tlon look pl~. and the re. .. ulling crisis engulfed the enti re region. The devalu-
allOII of the bah~ tnggered speculatIVe attacks o n the other currencies in the region. thus showing 
thallIfI e~phlluilion based solely on y.eak economic fundamentals is not eno ugh 10 explain the eri-
•• In SttImg lhc SlIlge for the anal) sls that fo llows. Secuon II briefly describes the past eco-
noemc perform~ o f ~ cou~tnelo In East :md SOluhcast ASia. Section III analyses the origins of 
the currrncy mSls~ \%hlle Section IV descnhc .. the e,ents leading to the crisis. Cenain policy im-
plK:3lJ()nS based on the lessons lramcd from thi~ cnsis are sug!!esled in Section V. Finally. Section 
VI describes the future outlook . both soon-term and long-leon, for the region. 
2, PAST ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
During Ihr last decade. polley make .... and academicians around the world have closely fol-
Iollied the economic success. oflhe cnuntnes III E.'l.~1 and SnulhcaM A~ia . From 196510 1996, coun-
Inti In thl ~glon g.rew fastcr than tho-.e of all olher reglon<; around the y,orld [See Tables 
I and 2J. Not e'eryooe benefitted equally but the boom was quile widespread. Most of these 
achu:vemcnts can be anributed 10 the growth petfoml:mce of the four tigers - Hong Kong. Singa. 
pore. Korea, Dnd Taiwan · and the Ihrt'C new ly industnalized countrics of SOUlheast Asia - Indone· 
SI1, Malaysia. nnd Thailand. 
These econo mics shared SOIllC characteristics Ihal helped in their stellar growlh perfonnance. 
Thtse include. but are nOi limitcd to. more rJ.pld output and productivity growth in agriculture: 
higher rates of gJ'O,uh of manu factured CItPOns; !>tceper and fas ter declines in the fenility mte : 
rugher growth rotes of physical capital: higher initial levels and growth rates of human capital : and 
generally higher rotes of productivity growth I Leipziger and Thomas ( 1994). Page (1994)1. 
What wert: the sources of thiS success? Wo rld Bank (1993) tried to identify them so lhm il 
coold be emulated in other developing counlrie..o; . The World Bank study pointed 10 the unusually 
stahlt macroeconomic pcrfonnnnce in these counlries which provided Ihe necessary structure for 
prhatc in\ estment. Po licies to increa.')oe the integrity of lhe banking systcm and make it more acce~­
sible to nontroditional savers roised the level o f financial savings. ulbor force skills improved duc 
10 an education policy thai focused on primary :tnd scrondary education: while agricultural policies 
emphasized Increases In producti,it) and le;:;s reliance on agricultur..d taxes. Moreover, pric.c dis-
tortions lIi'ere kept within a small r.mgC'. The-.c economic fundamentals were supplemented WIth \C -
1c:ct1'.C Intervention!> by the government which look many fonns. such as mild repression of Interest raI~ dirtcted cre(hl. promotion of selective industries. and trade policies fa"oring manufactured 
C\por1S. 
In shan. the remarkable groY, lh rote in East and Southeast Asian economies can ~ ~Uributed 
10 a SCt of commo n factors. including outward-orientoo. market- frie~dly govem~ent poliCIes. com-
plemented with macroeconomic stability. agricultural development . iOvestme ntlO human reSOurces, 
mobilisation o f savings. and high roles of productive investment IStiglit7. (1996). Egg leston 
(1997)1, ' , 
An important element in any successful explanation of Ihe Asian currency enslS must there-
fore be an answer 10 the question of how a system thai worked so well for so long could suddenly 
90 
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. . tn' to tackle this issue In order to get a better understanding of the callses fall. The next sectIon es . . . . . . 
h . . . .. tpon. nt to begin with an overview of the magnitude and composition of tapltal of I e ensls. II IS In . . 
flows in East Asia during the periocl leading to the ensls. 
(Table 3) Magnitude and Compositon of Capilal lnflows. 
percentage of GOP) 
1985·88 
Net Long-term capital nows <.4 
-Net official flo"'! 0 .4 
-Net private nows <.0 
Bank lending 0.0 
Ponfolio bond 0.3 
FOt 0.7 
PQnfolio &juhy 0,0 
IMFCredi l 
-0. t 
Other private flows 
-0.4 
of which: shon-Ieml debt 0.2 
In'-csunent 32.1 
National Savings 31.6 
-Private 24.5 
-Public 4.8 
Cutn"nl Account Deficit 0.2 
Total Capital lnnow! O. 
Rescn'c Accumulalioo 0.7 
Sou=,: World Bank: Alba ~I 0/ (1998). 
Investment. and Savings in East Asia (as a 
1989·92 1993-96 
3.0 6.2 
O. 0.<1 
,. , .• 
0.7 0.1 
O.t <.0 
t.3 l.O 
0.2 t.t 
.(). t 0.0 
-0,' -u 
0,7 0,' 
34.' li.' 
" ,0 l6.t 
28.3 JO.' 
, .• ,., 
0,8 t.' <.. 3,' 
I ,. 2.J 
In the latcr pan of the I 980s. the countries in East Asia led the developing world in pri\'ati! 
capital inflows lsee Table 3J. It's share of total capita l fl ows to the developing countries incrtased 
from less than 15 percent in the early 1980s to almost half during the 1990s. The composition of 
capital fl ow also changed during this period. Towards the end of the 1980s. commercial bank lend-
ing was replaced by fo reign direct investment (FDl): while in recent years portfolio flows :rnd 
short-tenn borrowing increased rapid ly. 
Another notewonhy characteristic o f the East Asian COUntries was that the flow of private 
capital was preceded by an increase in investme nl . In the late 19805 and early 1990s. the iOCJe3S(' 
in investment was financed mostly by increases in nationa1 savings (Alba el al (1998)1. During the 
las t few years. a much larger pon ion of the increase in in vestment was financed abroad. Howt\'er. 
the amount of pri vate capital flow far exceeded the amount of foreign savings absorbed leading to 
significam accumulation in international reserves. The magnitude of capital inflow varied across 
countries. ranging from a low of 15 percent of G DP in Korea to a high of 30 percent of GOP in 
Malaysia and Thai land (Alba el a l (1 998)]. 
3, ORIGINS OF THE CRISIS 
There is no single factor that can be ide ntified as the major cause fo r the currency crisis in 
EaSt and Southeast Asia. It is a fat al combinatio n of several self-reinfo rcing factors that led 10 this 
crisis. The predominant factors can be identi fi ed as fo llows: 
-
(1) EXTERNAL SECTOR PROBLEMS 
One of the common features that can be found among many of the countries affected by the 
currency crisis is thc growi ng current account deficit and the mi sali gnment in thc exchange 
rate. Tables 4 nnd 5 repon the Current Account/GOP ratio and several other balance of payment 
figures (or a number of Asian countries. respectively. In Table 5. Malaysia and Thailand show a 
significant deficit in their current account. In Malaysia. the average de fi cit is about 6 percent of 
GOP during 1990-%. while the ratio never ra ll s below 5 percent in Thailand since 1990. The Phil-
ippines also show a high current account dcficil. Although Indonesia sInned the decade with a rela-
ti\'cly high current account deficit. the situation improved during 1992-94 before worsening funher. 
K0«3'S deficit. though low in the early years. show signs or a sharp increase after 1995. However, 
it is nowhere close to the pronounced defici t problem round in the rour countries discussed earlier. 
In contrast. two other countries reponed in the Table, Hong Kong and S ingapore show a persistent 
high surplus in their current account. Although China experienced a small deficit in 1993 and 
1996, it's current account has been in surplus ror most or the remaining period. However. the sur-
plus declined over the years. 
{Table 4) Current Account (as a percentage 01 GDP) 
COUll try 199<1 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
""~ HJ9 3.27 UJ _1.9:1 1.211 0 .25 -0." KonJKOII! '..00 6_58 5.26 11 . 14 1.98 -2_2 1 0" 
I ...... ·2.82 -J .65 -2.17 - U J · U8 ·3. 111 
-3.37 -2.2 
Mm)si.a -2.03 -8.69 _3.74 -4.66 -6.24 ·8.43 -4.89 
.4.9 
Plulippines ·6.08 -2.28 - 1.89 -5.55 -4.60 · 2.67 
.J.17 ·S .2 
Sm81p01t' 8.33 11 .29 11.38 7.57 16.12 
16.81 ISM 15.4 
K~ 
-0." -2 .83 - 1.28 O.,\() _1.02 · 1.86 
..... 75 - 1.9 
ThO"'" .• .50 -7.71 -5.66 -5 .08 
-5.60 -8.06 -8. 10 · 1.9 
Sourte: l~lF. lnlC'rnatiomd Financial SU .. i~hC'<. Febroa,.,. 1998. Figures for 1997 an: from J. P. Morgan. 
(Table 5) Balance of Payments 1985-96 (as a percentage 01 GDP) 
Current BRlance 
Acc:ount or Trnde E, ," 
1m ," 
l~ia 2l .9 _IS.9 
1985·89 -25 6.0 
-2.S ,., 
24.2 _19.7 
'_96 
Mabysa 13.6 56.1 
.42.5 
1985-89 2.4 73.2 ·70.0 
' .... 96 -5.6 3.2 
PbilippllK'S 
-2 .9 17. 1 
. 20.0 
19&5-89 -0.' 17.4 _26.1 
,-" 
-3.3 . 8.7 
K~ 30.' _27.2 
1985·89 
" 
35 
-26.2 25.0 
'_96 · 1.7 .1."1 
""''''''' -2.2 
22.9 -25. l 
,"'-" 
-2.0 29.6 ->4.3 
, .... " -6.' 
-4.7 
Som:t: Radeln and Sachs (l998a). Table 9. 
92 
,. , 
93 
" 
Reisen (1997) has suggested thai foreign savings. following e.xcessi"~ cun:em 3CCOtmt,ddi. 
, , ' , ' f th savings are misallocaled due to market dlstonlOOs. As will be e lts, may nOI be benellela I . . . 
shown later in this paper. thai'S exactly what happened In the ASIan coumnes. . 
It is true that the coumries that suffered the greatest currency collapses· Indonesia. Mab.y_ 
, h ~' I " Ko-a and Thailand - are the ones who experienced huge current accountdefi_ sm, t e '-'1I .ppmes. .... . " K 
' H ve 00""'"05 with low CUlTCnt account deficlIS. such as China and Hong ong. and eus. owe T, .. u I • be'. 
those with current account surpluses. such as Singapore and Taiwan. have also seen t If CUmncleS 
tumble. Hence the CUrrenl llCCQunl alone cannot explain the crisis. 
If 
- I account balances alone can't explain the crisis. then the data on exchangr rak QUi-
cu ..... n r . . East and 
aJignme m can help to fill in some other pieces of the puzzle. M~st 0 the countnes In 
Southeast Asia pegged their exchange r:J.IC 10 a basket of currencies. wh~re t~ U. S. dollar Il,as 
g iven the maximum weight. Many analysts have .characle~sed Ihi~ ~ an Imphcl~ peg to .the U. S 
dollar. Exchange rates were maintai ned either With very lillie vanallon (Malaysia. Thailand. !he 
Philippines) or small . predictable changes (Indonesia, Korea). 
(Table 6) Nominal Exchange Rate (in terms of the US dollar), period average 
Country 1990 
'99' 1992 ' 993 '994 '995 '996 "., 
4.18 $.32 5.51 5.16 8.62 8.35 831 
'" 
anna 
Hong Kong 7.7'1 1.11 7.74 7.74 7.73 7.74 1.13 71) Indonesi. 1,84) 1,950 2,030 2,087 2.161 2.1-'9 2J.t2 2.909 Malaysia 2.10 2.15 
'" 
2.51 2.62 ~'" '.52 l!l Philippines 24.3 21.5 25.5 21.1 26.4 25.1 ,., ", SIngapore 1.81 1.73 1,63 1.62 LS3 1..11 1041 
.. " KQn:a ")8 73J 781 803 80) 771 80' ,,. Thailand 25.59 25.52 25.4(1 25.32 25.1$ 1492 1l.J.I 
'" Source; iMF, inlm'lationai Financial StatistIC$, Fcbn.t-r t998. 
Data on nominal exchange rates in selected Asian coumries are given in Table 6. During the: 
1990-96 period, the Malaysian ringgit and the Thai baht fluctuated against the dollar within a let) 
small band. In the Ph ilippines. the peso showed somc fluctuation against the dollar in the early 
1990s. but it was reasonably stable since 1994. Both the Korean won and the Indonesian rupiah de. 
preciated steadily against the dollar. While the won depreciated by about 14 percent O\'er the sel'en 
year period beginning in 1990. thc rupiah fell by more than 27 percent between 1990 and 
1996. The Chinese yuan showed some decline in ir s value against the dollar during the earl) 
1990s. China devalued its currency by about 50 percent in 1994. Sincc then. the yuan has been 
relatively stable. 
During 1994 and early 1995. the U. S. dollar deprcciati..'d in nominal terms against the Japa-
nese yen and Gennan mark . As a re.'iUII, the East Asian c urrencies gained competiti\eness as their 
currencies depreciated in trade-weighted tenus. Howcver. since the summer of 1995. the dollar 
staned to appreciate agai nst the major currencies, especially the yen. Over the following twO )ears. 
the dollar appreciated by about 50 percent against the yen pulling the Asian currencies along ~ith 
it. Wilh Japan being one of thei r major tmding panncrs. these COuntries suffered a substantial de. 
cline in competiti veness, wi th adverse effects on nct exports :tnd growth. These swings in com~ti. 
ti veness affected not ollly the current acCOUnt but also thc capital aCCOUnt of the balance of pay_ 
ments. mainly through their effects On the profitability of the production of traded goods and sero.-
ices and on investors' expectations of future exchange mle changes [lMF ( 1998)1. 
(Table n Percent Change in the Consumer Price Index 
Country '99' '992 '993 '99' 1995 '996 1997 
"'"' " 
OJ 1~ .6 24.1 16.9 
'.3 ~KOII' 11.6 9J II.!! 
2.8 
8.2 
'6 6.3 
, ...... .. 7.6 
'6 
,., 
,., 94 7' 6.6 
....,.. 
" " 
7' 17 JS J6 2.7 
-
1117 •. , 76 
" 
81 8.4 
'.0 
"'" 
' 3 6.2 .. , 6] 
" 
49 .., 
Tho"'" '.7 
" 
14 
" " 
'.8 '.6 
lIS' ., II 10 1.5 1.11 
" 
2.4 
So;uao' I\lF. InlmlOlllOnOIl FinaJl('Ial Stall"IC~_ Frbroouy 19')8. SI;md;anI &. Poor' , DRI 
Tabk 7 shows the CPI innation rate over the 1991 ~96 period for h U' _-' S be fA ' . I e mku tales and a 
nurn r 0 sian coumnes. Ahhou!!h the tnnmion differential between the Un ited Stales and most 
of ,the ASIan .coumric:' narro ..... ed since 1994. the innmion rale remained consistently h igher in the 
AsIan cou~lOes. Thl~ mea~s Ih:11 Ih~ exchange nile in 1110<;1 of these counlrie.'l appreci ated in real 
(enns. 11us .res~lted '." an Increase In the relative price of their exports in the world market and. 
hence, a decline In their real compclitivenc\!>. 
(TableS) Real Exchange Rate (Year-end figure: average for year 1990= 100) 
Country '990 ,99, ,992 '9'}3 '99' '99' , ... 1997 
Ho!!a Kon, '00 ,1>1 
"" 
116 
"' 
116 126 IJ8 
........ 97 '00 .0.
"" 
.0. .0. '0' " 
.\bIa)sU 97 97 
"' "' 
.07 .07 112 
"' PIII,hppt~ 
" 
10' .07 97 112 110 116 
" SID,apIln.' 
'0' .06 '06 '0'1 112 113 
"' ." , •. 97 
" " " " " 
87 
" 
""'"" 
'02 
" 
.00 102 
" 
102 '01< 
" 
Sourtt: 1. P Morgan 
Table 8 repon..s the re levant figures fo r the real exchange rates. Among the five CQUlllnc" 
considem:l for this study. only Korea showed .. depreciation in the real exchange r:lle between 1990 
and 1996. Using 1990 as the base )ear. the Ko rean " ,on depreciated by :.bout 10 pcrc;ent over thi ~ 
pmod. On the o ther h .. nd, currencies in the remaining four countries appreciated in .Teal terms by 
".tying amounts _ from a low of 5 percent in Thailand to a high of about 26 percent in Hong Kong 
and the Philippines. Among the remaimng countries. the appreciat ion " as highest in S ingapore. 
It is interesting to note that countries which targeted exchange rate stability - Hong 
Kong. Malaysia. the Philippines. and Thailand - experienced a hig her degree of real currency ap-
preciation than countries. suc h as Indonesia and Korea. thai followed a relatively nexible exchange 
rate regime. 
One noteworthy char:lctcnstic that would be clear from the Tables on the current .. ccount 
defici t and real exchange r.ue is thai countries with an overvalued c urrency were mo",! likely to ex-
perience a worsening o f their current account. M .. laysia. the Philippine ... and Thailand experienced 
the largest appreciation as " ell as the highest c urrent account deficits. On the other hand, China 
... 
• 
• 
94 
95 
· ed I · ·" cu-n' ""count along with :l real depreciation in its currency [Corsetti nat enJoy a surp us In I • n , ..... 
( 1998)). 
(Table 9) Growth Rate of Exports 
Country 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
13.>0 16.60 8.4\ 8.78 13.39 ' .M 
.""""". 
Malaysia 17.0 3 18.13 16. 11 23." 26.63 10.\3 
Philippines 7.99 II 13 15.79 . .." ,. <0 32.90 
K~. 10.23 8.0J 7.fH 15.72 31.52 ." 
Thailand 23.11 13.10 1339 22.20 24 66 .1.11 
Source: IMF, InlcllUIl iQnlll Financial StallSlie.s. Fcbrouy 1998. 
Another contributing factor to the external imbalances is the slowdown of exportS in anum· 
ber o f Asian countries. Altho ug h the rising renl exc hange rate was nOI an issue until after mid 
1995. tradeable goods producers in these countries were under severe competith '( pressure. Table 
9 shows the growth r.He o f exports. Until 1995 all fi ve countries reported impressh'c export 
growth. However. in 1996 the growth rate fell sharply in all cououies. except the Philippines. In 
fact, the growth rate became negative in Thailand. On ly the Philippines reported an increasing 
trend in export carn ings. The fall in exports can be attribUied to a number of factors. First. the 
slowdown of the Japanese economy in the early 1990s led to a decline in the demand for !heir 
goods in Japan. Second. as discussed earlier. the appreciation of the doll ar since mid· I995 reduced 
the cost-competitiveness of their exports in the international market. The emergence of low<OSt 
exports from Vietnam and South Asia didn't help the s ituation either. Third, a glut in the glob:tl 
e lectronics market resulted in a sharp fa ll in export prices of products. such as Stmi· 
conductors. This had a particularly adverse impact on Korea. Malaysia. and Thailand. Fourth, a 
widespread deceleration of imports by the industrial countries. especially in Europe. due to sluggish 
growth also contributed 10 the slowing in export markets. 
Recent articles in the popular press (sec Financial Tima . September 17. 1997 and frotto. 
mi.u , November 22, 1997J have suggested that the 50 percent devaluation of the Chinese cuntncy. 
renminbi, in 1994 led to a deterioration in cost-competitiveness in East and Southeast Asia. How-
ever. the impact of this massive devaluation on the region is nOI very clear as by 1993 about SOper· 
cenl of Chinese transactions were already settled al the swap mark.et rute. so the devaluation in !he 
offic ial exchange rate affected only 20 percent of the foreign exchange transaction (See Liu t l tJl 
( 1998»). 
(2) FINANCIAL SECTOR WEAKNESSES 
If there is one single factor that can be picked as contributing to the vulnerabili ty of the East 
Asian economics, it has to be the weaknesses in their financial system (Clessens and Glaessner 
( 1997)1. Insufficient capital adequacy ratios, inadequate legal Jending limits on borTower1. inack-
quate asset classification systems and poor provis ioning for possible losses. and poor disclosure and 
transparency of banking institutions were common characteristics of the financial system in many 
of these countries IAlba et al ( 1998»). 
K~mi nsky and Reinhard (1 997). among others. have suggested that balance of payments cri· 
ses,are. highly correlated with banking crises. Evidence from the Asian countries strongly supports 
their view. The fi nancial .sectors in these countries were deeply flawed due mainly to bad manage-
-mmt: poor occoonting. regulatory and supcrvi,ory standards: imlppropriate financial libcralisation. 
andO\er-oplimism regarding the econo my's lo ng-tcnn growth polenl ia!. 
In many countries. of which Indone .. ia. Korea. and Thailand arc prime examples, the linan-
eill system was politiciM:d: capital wa" c hannelled to politicall y preferred borrowers without any 
considtmlion of the ir repaying capabilities. Financial dcc i ), ion~ were unduly influenced by non-
t'COOOmic considerations. giving ri -.c to inevitable corruption. Countries varied in tcnns of the per-
ception of financial \ ulnerabllily. Ko rea appea red to be the most vulnerable among the group: fol -
)(Ned by Thail and and Indo ne .. ia. The PhilipPines appeared to be the least vulncrnble in the group. 
During the curly 19905, the countries in this reg ion gal caught up in a g lobal wave of finan-
cill hberatisation. Lnws reslr1cllng capl l:11 Oo ws were aboli ~hed . Tax inccnti ves were givcn 10 off-
short borrowing by financial inlcnnediane:-. A large number of bank and non-bank financial inler-
mtdiarirs. such as the finance companies In Thailand . \\ere crealed . However, the deregulation 
IUS not done in a prudent and properly SL"tlue nccd way, Consequently. regulatory rules and agen· 
cies wert nOl created at a fast eno ugh p.1ce in o rder to supervise these financ ial institutions ]scc Ta-
ble 10J. This led to bad management and lending praclices and poor accounting \IMF 
(1997). Claessens find Glacssner ( 1997) J. 
(Table 10) Bank System Risk Exposure and Financiallnfrastruclure 
Indont'Sia Korc~ Malaysia I'h ilil·pines Thailand 
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So.m:a;; FoIl Cft5-Landau .. , ul t 1995). Rel""n ( 1998). 
Stiglitz (1998) has suggested that a combination of dcregulated capital accounts and domestic 
undefTC gulalion of the financial ~clor can be a cause of vulnerability to CXlc~na l ,shOC~S. ,An anal~' 
sis of the East As ian COUniries will show that domestic and external financta,l hberahsa~ lon h~d at 
. d mpetitio n withm the bankmg systcm 
least t ..... o rdnforcing clements . Fi rs t. there was an mcrease co . I f 
. I ' ' ' s that reduced the franchise va uc 0 
as ..... ell as bct\\ccn banks and non·bank financla IOSUluuon . 
. . ' Second banks wcre borrowmg 
banb and induced the m to pursue nsky Invc:stment strategies, · d' , 
. ~ ' ndes 'md through short-ternl le n mg. 
heavily from foreign lenders. often III unhedged orelgn cum ' . d S d Europe ,I 
. . .. 'n the Umle tales an -1be high domestic interest rates relatIve to the Interest r.lIcs I 
tmcl~ this foreign capital. ' . don through 
In the absence of a strong bond and equity market. financial int,crmedlauon was c" f 
the banking system. Thus the local banks and other financial institutions became the benefiCiary 0 
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this capital in nux . The relatively predictable nom inal exchange roles with minimal flUClutuiOils in 
these countries reduced the perceptions of exchange rate risks and thereby reduced the incentives 10 
hedge external borrowing. The resulting accumulation of external liabilities were in the form of 
unhcdged liabilities. 
The financial imermediaries channeled Ihis money 10 speculative investments and projrcts 
thaI were. at best. marginally profitable. In [odonesia. Malaysia, and Thailand a large proportion 
of this money went to real estate speculation. [n Korea, on the other hand. many banks Wtre coo-
trolled by the cltaebols. who c hanneled this money to large traded sector companies. 
(Table 11') 
I . Evidence of Banking Risks in the Region (end of 1997) 
Count .. NPL .. 
1997 1998 
Hong Kong 1.5% J."'" 
Indonesia 
" 
,. 
Malaysia 7.5 I' Philippines 
" 
7 
Singapore 2 J.' 
Korea I. 22.S 
Thailand 
" 
2S 
NPL.cnon-performing loans as a perccnl3gc of ICMallooll5. 
propcny"'pmpcny_S<:ctor eJlJXl'§urt' as a percentage of lOla] loans. 
CAR...:apitaJ to asset ratio. 
SouI'C'e: J. P. Morgan. 
n. Non-pertorming loans and their Costs 
Country NPL' 
Indonesia 7>% 
K~, 
'" Malaysia 
" 'Thailand 
" 
Historical Crisis Costs: 
Brazil (1994-96) 
'" Chile(l981.8S) 16 
Mexico ( 1!)9,a.95) 
" 
I'ro n, 
40-5$'10 
25·30 
JO-4O 
15-20 
JO.4O 
15-25 
JO-4O 
NPL..c~on-perfonnin8 loans as a pen:entagc oftotrd loans. at peak of crisis 
Loans! 
Collateral CAR 
>0-7(" 1>2'" 
80-100 
.10 
80-100 
." 71).11<1 1~18 
7()'1I<I 18-22 
80-100 610 
80-100 610 
Resolution Cosl' 
"'" 60 
" 
" 
I"'" 
" 
" 
Resolution CQSt as a prn:cnt!lgc of GOP. lllese oosu include di " . 
exchange r.lle s.ubsidies, as defined by the IMF For the Soul rect c:osu 10 go.\e.mmem llS well as quast-fl5Cal a$S sucillIS ca~1S for 1998 GOP; for HistOrical c . . 'IM' . hcast .AslIlSl countnes. OOSI is f:alculatcd based 011 Iwdl)~ fin-
ns,s COSiS. calculaTions usmg GOP during restructuring period are used 
Source: 1be Wall Street Journal, December 9, 1998. . 
Table I I prov ides fi gures relating to these bank' . 
d b b • 109 practIces. A large proportion of the loans 'pcn~: ~ an, ks and non -bank financial insti tut ions were of inferior quality. The amount of non-
nnmg oans as a percentage of lotal loa . h '. 
ns 10 t esc CQunlnes g ives Some indication of the e.'(-
-
lent or this problem. Although the ratio varies across countries. it is substantially high in Indone-
sia. Malaysia. Korea. and Thlliland - the count ric!> hardc~t hit by the crbis. The large amount of 
non.perfonning loans increased the credit crunch as banks. ..... ere reluctant 10 forcdosc and sell dis-
uesscd asseLS. 
AnQ(hcr area of concern had been lending to Individuals and corponations against stocks as 
collaler.ll. 3nd these bank' s own equity in vcqmc nt ... . Ban~.s in Malaysia. Korea :lIld Thailand were 
the hardest hil . As the Table indicate .. , exposure to the rists io\'olving the propcny sector was also 
.. tlUJOI' source of bank troubles. Finally, the banks In <;o me of thCl>C countries were undercapil:ll-
istd. The capital-assct r:uio in Indonc .. ia. Malay,ia. Korea. and Thailand hovered around single 
digits. As this ralio was Ie .... than the .. hare of oon-pcrfonning loans, bank capital had been practi-
call) wiped OUI. Only Hong Kong, Si ngapore, and th(: Philippines demonstrated a respectable 
caplW-JSSe'! rJ.IIQ. 
One of the major barrier. sl3ndmg In the way of rl.'Co\e!,) for A!.ia·, economies is the amount 
ofrod debt. totaling an estimmed S I trill ion. The co,t to the economics of ~uch staggering bad debt 
can be Setn in the lower portion of Table II. The rc~olutLon co"t o f the non-perfonning loans. as a 
perttntage of GOP. \aries from a 10\'. of 45 percen t In Thailand to a high of 60 percent in Ko-
rea. The extent o f the problem can be compre he nded by looking at comparJ.ble figures from recent 
Iwtking crises in Latin America. 
(3) OEBTINOICATORS ANO THE NATURE OF CAPITAL FLOW 
Current account defic its. which repre,!,e nt the diffen~nce bet,,"een nmional savings and in\'e~t ­
men!, are financed by either a capital innow or an accumulation of debt. Capital inllows in the 
form of foreign direct investment arc strictly non·debt creat ing . Other",i,e, current account deficill> 
leJd to accumulation of foreign debt. Thi:. may be In tht: fonn of purcha-.c of domestic bonds and 
equities by foreig n national:. or foreign borrowing by the domest ic banks. In case of the A~ian 
countries. foreign borrowing by the bank ing ltystelll financed the major portion of the current ac-
count deficit. 
The sustainability of a current account deficit is dctennined. in many ways. by the composi-
tion of capital inflows. Short-ternl capilal inflows arc llIorc volatile than long-tenn inflows while 
equity inflows arc more stable than debt-crcating innows [Corsetti el (// (1998)}. Hence long-term. 
tquity im'estmcnts are prefe rable for sustaining a current account defic it . 
-
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-(Table 12) Net Private Capital Flows in the Five Countries (annual averages; percent of GOP) 
1975-82 1983-91 1".z.96 
IlIdonesia 
---
Net pri,-aIC capital flows 1.1 2.6 
••  NC1 direct .n'·~nl O~ O' I.' 
Net portfoliO In"dlmenl 01 0.1 07 
Oilier net Investment 0.' 19 2.1 
Sho'Ncnn liabilities ...  I.' ,. 
K~. 
Net private capital 0011'$ 
' .7 ... 3.2 
Net dilttl m\"estmI"nt 0.1 0.1 .. J 
Net portfolio In,'mmenl 0.1 O.J ,. 
Other nellll\'estment ,., ... 
" SlIon-u:nn liabilities J .' O' 17 
Malaysia 
Net private capital 00"''5 
'. 1 ' .1 10j 
Net direct in'-WInent 3.7 J.' ., 
Net ponfolio in"dlment 
Oilier net 1n"dUnent 1.4 0.' Jj 
Soon-lerm liabilities 0.' 0.' J~ 
Philippines 
Net private capital nows H ... 
" 
Net direct in\"cstment 0.5 1.0 1.7 Net portfolio IQ\'esunent 0. 1 01 0.1 Othn net IIWestmenl 
'.0 
-1.9 3.0 Shor'Hcrm liabilities 2.9 
-2.0 2J 
"'" """ Net private capita] fImo.., 4.0 
' .7 •• Net dil"e(1 in\'eslment 0.' I.J Net portfolio in\'Qlment 1.0 
Other net IQ\"estment 0.' 2.1 
3.' 3.' SIlon·lt:nn liabilities '7 1.7 2.8 4.7 
Sou~; IMF, WoOd EconomIC: Outlook. ScptemMT. I998. 
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(Table 13) EX1emal Financing in Five Asian Economies (in U.SS billion)" 
,.,,, 
'''5 '996 
ClnmI Acwunt Ibl:anc-c 
-2·U 
-4 1.0 
-,..  
~ Fi~III. r'In 45.2 81~ 100.6 
Pn .... fIoof,j" 11ft 37 .9 79.0 103.2 
Eq\III.y I n"~1TImI 121 15.9 19.7 
DutctEq",uy 
" 
, .• ,. 
Portfoloo Eq"'II), 
" 
11.0 1.l,9 
Pn.*CmblOD 6.15 fIJ. 8H 
CommnnaI Ibnls n4 ~ .\ 2 65.3 
Noa-Nn1. Pn, errol( 2.-t •• IS.2 0fI'1t~ Aoo. .. lit'! 7 .. 1 2!1 
·26 
.'1 Fin.. IllS!. 
-0' 03 
·2.0 
Bi4IknI Cmh,oo; 77 29 
-0' 
1tewde:II~. lid' 
-15 ~ -:!6.5 
-268 
Rewr.CH\d ,okI I·a i~) 
-H - 14 0 
-19.3 
MmIo shon·1tml CrNU\. net 
' .. 1 
'"' 
J8.5 
1\r fi,'c COUIlll1C:J aft I~,ill. "'bla)"oa. PtuhPPIIlC.'. Kon:a. and Tha,l~ntl 
~-
""'"-
IKkdlo, ~I net kndon,. mone'lIt)' gold. and error< and ornl"-'lon' 
Sou.tu; IlISIil~ of Inlerna •• OIIlII Fin:lf\Cc. Jan\lat) 21. 1999 
' .. 7 
-26 .3 
28.8 
- I I 
3.' 
• •  
-3.2 
--u 
-25 () 
21.0 
"'. 
22.1 
79 
·.15.0 
n .5 
.417 
, .... ,-
58.5 43.2 
-O~ 
· 1.2 
-28.3 
-4.8 
., 111.7 
'A 14.2 
2.1 ,., 
-Ml.8 
-23,4 
-35.0 
- '11.8 
-1.7 ..... 
218 3_' 
21.6 
-2.0 
' .1 ,-, 
- 16.9 
-14.9 
-JI.I 
-21.0 
·n.1I 
Tables 12 and 13 repon the relevant data for the counlries in our sample. Ttlble 13 show!<o 
that net exlcmal financing in Ihe five coumries alrTtost doubled from 1994 to 1995. In 1996. it in-
creased by more than 12 percent. This sharp increase in capital innows in these fi ve coumries can 
be lliributed to both external as wcll as imemal fac tors. Externally. libemlisation in the deve loped 
capilal mmets helped the now of capilal to the emerging markets. in general. and the Asian mar-
kets. in panicular. Innovalions of various financial instruments and deri\l3lives also facilitaled an 
wy flow of fuods across coumrie..o;. In addition. higher interest r:lles in these countries relali\le to 
the rates in the U. S. or Japan allracled forei gn capital. Domesticall y. financ ial deregulation. local 
gO\'emmcnl incentives. and a perceived reduction in exchange rate ri sks due to prediclablc pegging 
to the US dollar also encouraged capital flows to these countries. 
Concentrating on the figures for 1996. only 19 percent of the net privale capital flow came in 
terms of equity in\'estment by non-residen!!;. Private creditors. mostly commercial banks. ac-
COUnted for the remaining proponion of external fina ncing. 
Large surges of shon -Ienn and potentially revcrsible capi tal flows 10 developing countries 
can ha\le adverse effccts (Griffith-Jones ( 1998a)). Fi rst. these surges present complex policy dilem-
mas for policy management. as they can initially push key macroeconomic variables. such as. ex -
change nltes. prices of assets like propeny and shares. away from what could be considered their 
Iong-tenn equilibrium. Second. lhese nows present the risk of very shall' reversals. These 
~\'ersals-p:tr1icularly if Ihey lead to currency and financial crises-can resulr in serious losses of OUI -
put. in\·estmc.nt. and employment. That is exactly what happened to Ihe East Asian countries. 
Comparing the now of capital immediotely before and aOer the crisis. thai is. figures for 
1996 and 1997. net private innow of private capilallo the fh'e Asian countries dropped by $ 109 
100 
• 
• 
• 
.. 
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bill ion _ from 597. 1 bill ion to -SII.9 bill ion. Direct equity investment rel1lll.ined rel:ui\cly C'OaStanI 
while portfolio equi ty investment dropped by $16.7 billion. The bulk of the dttline C31M from 
commercial bank lending which dropped by $82.6 billion. 
The sudden reversal in net capital flows. following a sustained period of continuous inmue. 
had a tremendous contrdctionary impact on these fi ve countries by severely restricting ~ic 
bank capital and, thereby bank lending. The problem was exacerbated by two chal"3CtenSlics of tim 
capital flow _ the short-ternl nature and the foreign currency denomination of the debt. The magro-
tude of 5uch a reversal within such a short period of time cannot be explained solely by the underly. 
ing structural problems in these economies. 
(4) WAS THERE A MORAL HAZARD? 
There has been a significant amount of deb~lte on whether the sudden rise of capnal Inilov.s 
to these countries was partially due to the presence of a moral huard on the part of the fomgn 
lenders. To analyse th is issue. let us look at the five affected countries - Indonesia.. Malaysia. 1M 
Philippine. Korea. and Thailand. Bank Icnding 10 these fivc countries rose sharply after Ihe Mexi-
can bailout. Nel new loans from banks increased from $23.4 billion in 199" to $55.7 billion In 
1996. Lending by thc bond market also illcreased from $2.4 billion in 1994 10 522.7 billion in 
1996. while equity investment increased by 50 percent to $18 billion. 
But it is not at a ll clear whether this increase in capital flows reflects the exptCtation of bail· 
outs. or a combination of abundanl liquidity. higher relum. and the perception that these \Ioeft all 
well run. low-risk economies. A large portilln of the investmenls went to areas. such as lending to 
companies. that were less lik:ely to be bailed out. The fact that SO much of the capilnl no ..... ing to 
these economies was in this unprotected fonn may be evidence that moml hazard was nOlthe domi-
nant reason for the increase in capital flows . 
In a statement before the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services. FtdenI Re-
scrve Bank: chairman Alan Greenspan estimated that Asian equity losses. excluding Japan. WIre 
July 1997 would exceed $700 billion of which more than $30 billion has been lost by US imes-
tors. Substantial further losses are aJso expected in bonds and the real estate sector. 
One possible test for the presence of moral hazard would be to compare the perfonnanct of 
spread (the interest margin over riskless US Treasury bonds) of emerging market debt instllltnC'nlS 
with those on high-yield US corporate bonds. While both types of high yielding bonds carried a 
simi lar rat ing. only emerging market debt would benefit from a potentiallMF safety net. 
Available statistics show that between 1994 and 1997 spreads on high yield US corpOClI.IC 
debt narrowed more than those on emerging market debt. This is just the re\'erse of what \Ioould 
happen if there was moral hazard . 
. A re le~ant question may be that if moral hazard didn't have an impact before the crisis. is il 
poSSible that It had an impact after the crisis? 
The question whether IMF-sponsored safety nets encouraged reckless behavior by go\em-
men! of the borrowing countries is also dOUlbtfu l. Despite rescue packages. countries were af-
fected. For example. recent J. P. Morgan eslimates show that. for instance both Korea and Indo-
nesia are likely 10 experience a decline in domestic demand in 1997 of about '20 percent. 
. . If there was. any moral hazard problem in Asia. it arose mainly in the expeclalion of bailouts 
wlthl~ the domes.tlc financial systems. This encouraged excessive borrowing by banks. If the IMF 
contnbuted to thiS problem. it was mainly due. to the expectation of the investors that IMF \Ioould 
provide foreign exchange 10 service debt to foreig n bank .... 
. A~other f~I that needs to be: taken into account is Ihat the expectat ion and magnitude of lMF 
intervention vanes from one country to another. For example. it is unrealistic 10 assume that Tha.i-
land is as imponant to the US and IMF as. say Mcxico This is bee. f M . . . 
. . . . use 0 e:uco s geograph ical 
proxmuty to the US markets as wdl as it being a member of NAFfA H .• ' I · . 
. . . cnce we ,. eXlcan bm lout 
lS unhkcly to set any precedent for the Asian COuntries. 
(Table 14) Moody's Long Term Foreign Currency Debt Ratings, 1996-97" 
Country December 1996 JUnt' 1997 Dttember 1997 
,-., 8~1 8m' B~' ... ,~ AI AI AI 
I'Iibppo.-s 8, , 8a 1 B. I 
.... AI AI 8~' 
"" .... Al A2 bl 
Mood} 'slb:l",S)s&ml.fromhl,h<''''lolo''~. Aaa. Ali i . A:l2. A2 '. A I. A2. AJ. Baa I. 8u2. Baa 3. Ba I. 8a 
l Bal. 
~J. P Morpn 
(5) CREDIT RATINGS 
One imponant quc .. tion is. did the market predict the downturn in these economie. .. ? Credit 
nlting agencies provide an ongoi ng assessment of credit ri sk in the emerging markets. Any expec-
tation of a financial cris is in a specific country would be recognised by these agencies and would 
lead to a decline in it's cred it ratings. Table 14 shows Moody's crcdit ratings for the fi ve coun -
tries. Comparing the ratings from December 1996 wi th those in June 1997 would show that none 
of the countries expericnced a decline in their ratings prior to the crisis. In facl. the credit r::l.Iings 
forthe Philippines actually improved. Only after the crisis staned in June. 1997 did Moody's re-
duce the credit ranking of Korea and Thailand. On December 22. 1997. however. Moody's down-
graded the sovereign debt of Indonesia. Korea. and Thailand. pUlling them below in vestment 
gt3de. Downgrading the raling 10 th is 'junk bond ' status had at least two imnu.'diate implications. 
First. the ICllers of creelit issued by the commercial banks in these countries to its c"poners and im-
porters wen: no longer internationally recognised. Second. the downgrading of the sovereign debt 
meant th:il no domestic enterprise could ha vc :l credit rating higher than the sovereign. This led to 
I large wave of debt liquidat ion by the cred iton. prompting runs on banks. 
11us paper has so far argued that none of the factors which have been put forward is. in itl>Clr, 
aJ llhat unusual , or sufficient to explui ll the magnitude of the cri sis. It is the combimuion of these 
fanors and the fact that they were self-re inforcing and mutually compounding thaI triggered the cri -
sis .... hen one weak link broke. it exened more pressure on other linkages. which broke down under 
the hea\·y burden placed on them. 
4. THE ROLE OF THE IMF 
The role of the IMF during the Asi an cri sis has increasingly come under scrutiny. The IMF 
!\assigned massive financial packages totalling more than $ 100 billion with Indonesia. Korea. a~d 
Thailand. These bailout packages are conditional on structural adj ustment measures and reforms III 
the bwmg sector. Fischer ( 1998) assumes thaI a fi scal surplus w~uld f~ resources to ~over .'he 
cost of restructuring. Similarly. he argues that banking refonns IIlcl~dlllg closures of IIlsoh ent 
banks are necessary to accelerate the restructuring process of the financial sector. Some of the IMF 
•• 
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-sponsored refomls, if properly implcmcmoo. might help the economies in the loog run. BUllhe 
nature of lMF's intervention is making things worse. at least in the shon run. This can be attributed 
10 severnl factors. 
First, the lMF' s insistence on struCtura1 refomlS in areas which are unrebted to the irnrnedi-
ale problems facing these economies have increased the sense of panic among in,'estors. II Stnds I 
signal that these economies are basically unsound and need a complete overhaul. notwUhstandinr 
their sustained economic growth during the last three dec3des. This obviously frightens potential 
investors and lenders. The IMF's immediate concern shou ld be to insis t only on policies that m 
needed 10 restore a COUnlry's access to the g lobal financial markel. 
Second, with a v iew 10 stabilizmion o f the currency market and to discoomge compet.iu\t~ de· 
valuations. the IMF has forced these countries 10 maintain a high Ie\cl of real jn t~rest rates. But tht 
current condition in these countries are not conducive to a high rate. It only provides a petttptioo 
of an uncenain future and funher discourages foreign in\'l~stmcnt in the area fRadelet and Sachs 
(1998:1)1. The impact of the high real interest rate is already being fe lt in several countrit:S.~­
cially Indonesia and Korea. Business enterprises, which are already indebted. find their existing il-
liquidity problem quickly changing into an insolvency problem. This has forced companies to cut 
back on production, sell inventories. fire employees. and defauh on debt_ This creates a SOO"I\--baIl 
effect in the economy by increasing banking system's bad loan accumulation, and weakening !he 
banks' capital base. 
Third, the IM F traditionally holds back on disbursing funds from their bailout package until 
the borrowing country carries out necessary structural reforms. Such conditionality violates the iD-
tem of a lender of last reson. 
Founh, the contractionary budget policies required of the borrowing country also delay !he 
recovery process. It seems that the IMF has fi na lJy realised the folly of this requirement and re-
cently relaxed some of the fi scal constraints imposed on Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand_ 
Finally. the lMF' s insistence on a regime of capital account convertibility that includes free 
flows of capital is pushing these countries towards more uncertainty as their economy is not robust 
enough to be exposed to the shocks that unbindered capital flows can bring. 
5. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
. Asia's financial c risis will almost certainly lead to important cbanges in tbe international fi-
nanCial s~stem, a,s countri~ try to find an appropriate balance between the benefits from gaining 
access to tntema~lonal capital nows and the potential for instability and o ther risks that also seem to 
be much greater In a world of large and highly mobile capital movements. What can we learn from 
the ~nt experi~nce with this currency crisis? Although the crisis is not yet definitively o,·er, 
~or~e Issues ":latln8 to the problems of crisis management can already be identified_ Thus an 0b-
JectIVe analYSIS of the events would provide important lessons for analysts and policy mak-
ers. Some.~rthese lessons are more obvious than o thers. Some are preventive, designed 10 reduce 
the probability of financial crisis in the future' while olhe" are ~'d I . 
. ' .. "' .... lun amenta In nalure. 
. . One of the major lessons of the Asian crisis is that improperly sequenced financiallibetalisa-
lion In the presence of a weak domestic financial systcm increases vulnerability to speculati"e at-
tacks, In order to develop the do nesti fi . I . 
I C Inancln system. governmental supervision and prudenual 
regulation. should ~ aimed al creating competent management. effcctive risk-control systems. ade-
quate capital reqUIrements, lender of last resort facilities. supervisory authori ties with sufficient 
autonomy, and control of cross-border banking (Bustelo ( 1998), Griffilh.Jones (l998a)). 
AlK)(hcr lesson rnal can be learned from the Asian crisis is thai il is not enough for a country 
[olChi~\'e susillined economic growth. The Asian economies were highly commended not too long 
ago for their rapid growth. Fiscal policy was not pronigalc. monetary policy was nOI innationary, 
and the countries achieved high savings lind investment rolles. However. thc!tC fu ndamentals alone 
.... ert not enough 10 insulate an e<:onorny from 11 crisis. What is crucial is thai coumrics also try 10 
Rep other fundamentals sound. Moreover, the appropri'lIcncss of financial and exchange rate PJli-
~ also matter. For example. pegging the c)I;changc r.ue helps 10 create an environment where in-
restors and fr-adcn Can predIct theIr future plans. BUI such policies are more difficult to maintain in 
the presence of weak domestic financial inslilUlions and lurge-scale fluctuations in the value of in. 
ttmational currencies. 
The Asian crisis can be described as a "capital account crisis·' 3S opposed to a ··current ac-
count criSIS'·. The quick reversal of ~hon-teml capllal flows denominated in foreign currency trig-
gered this crisis. As Griffith-Jones ( 1998a) has ~hown. short-tcnn and potentially reversible capiull 
inflows tend to alter importunt macroeconomic variables, such as exchange rJ.les and assel prices. 
An important lesson is that while the long-term benefit of free capiwl movement is generally ac-
knowledged. certain steps must accompany cupital account libcralisation in order to reduce volatil-
il}. Thest steps relme to the 105titutional capacity of the domestic economy and the proper se-
qoenc:ing of the liberaJi sation programme. I)otentially more stable. long-tenn capital inflows 
should be initially libcralised, rJther than short-tenn borrowlOg denominated in foreign currency. 
Griffith·Jones ( 1997) ha.~ sugge~led that capita l accounts should be liberalised slowly and/or 
that more controls and/or taxes be introduced to discourage shan-term capital innows. Both the 
IMF (1995) and Bank of International Settlement (1995) have recognised that. though having some 
limitations. measures taken by recipient governments to discoumge shon-term capital nows - when 
combined with other sound macroeconomic policies · playa pasillve role in managing these flows 
effecth'ely and thus reduce the possibility of ;} dest;}bilising financ ia l crisis. In fact, Calvo and 
Goldstein (1995) have ~uggcsled that measures. such liS controls/taxes on shon-tenn capital move-
ment should become pan of a revised "Wa5hi ngton consensus··. 
One of the chumcteristics that has been com lllon among the affected countries is that they 
h.a'e encouroged behind-the-scenes mechanisms for capital allocation. IL is true whether we arc 
considering the government-linked banks in Indonesia. chaebol-controlled b:Jnks in Korea. or the 
filUlll('t companies in Thailand. In all ca.~s. capital allocations were ma,de b~d .on pcrson~1 or 
buJ.iness ~Iationships or government innucllce. As is evident from the diSCUSSion 10 the prevlOu~ 
sections. this led to increasingly poor investment decisions. 
One of the Immediate lessons of this crisis is the need to strengthen the structure llOd supcrvi-
. . . . . 5. ""C' prudential su ... ·rvision wou ld in-501011 of the financml systems 10 the emergmg econom ies. ro = . I~ 
,·ohe better monitoring of how banks r.tise the funds that are lent. both 10 the ~hon and ~ong te.nn 
and in local and foreign markets. It would require monitoring the concentratlo~ of I~elr lendlOg 
. . .he ad..-nuacy of their capital: and the ponfolios lind their consequent exposure to certam sectors. -.... .. . 
disclosures of. and provisions for. non-perfomling loans. A well-functlomng banklOg syste~. free 
I d· , t as the swble core of the financial sec· from the pressures of connected or command en 109. can 3C 
.... 
. I k t function more efficiently A necessary corollary is that the international capita mar e can . . 
. < . n s art avai lllbic Lack of mfonnatlon cer-
when complete accessible and timely II'Ilormalion ow . I · I d 
. . H ·pareney at 'III levels - loea . natlon:J . .an lainlyexacerbated the financial cri~is in ASia. ence mills • . . 
. r: . ffi ·als are to successfully moll1lor. SUpervise 
international - is essential if domcsuc and orelgn 0 .ICI . . If is not a suffic ient con-
and warn of any impending danger. However. better mfonnatl~~. by It~ ... . a d the will-
. I ceded is the VIsIon to Imagme cnses n dition fOf eliminating such crises, What IS a so n 
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ingness 10 aCI pre-emptively. 
Another fundamental lesson from the currency crisis would be to avoid an early misdiagnosis 
of the crisis. For instance. Thailand's financial crisis was initially seen as a liquidity probkm 
rather than an issue of solvency. Valuable time was lost before the go\'cmment began to rnIiu 
that a fundamental change in economic policy was required. 
The weak initial response to the crisis by many Asian governments prolonged the debacle. 
In Thailand. for example. the government's political weakness clearly hampered efforts 10 ch3llge. 
In Malaysia, where political decision-making is more concentr:l.ted. there had been resistance to ~ 
notion thai current difficulties have panial ho me-grown characteristics. Similar obslades were prt. 
scm in Indonesia and the Philippines. The govemmenl's response should be s .... ift and res0-
lute. They should act fast to clean up financ ial systems hobbled by bad debts. lOc ~ and scope 
of nceded refonn should not be underestim3led. 
The crisis highlights the need for strong capital markets in the devcioping countries lIS I 
source of capital that is both cheaper and less volatile than o ffshore borrowi ng. A welJ.functioning 
equity and bonds market would diven capital nows into more efficient use by placing ifl\·tStmenl 
projects under a rigorous market test. Such a market test would improve corporate governance. 
References 
AIb.1. P .. A. Bhattocharya. S. Clae!>sen'l. S. Ghosh, and L. Hem andez (1998). "Volatility and 
Contagion in a Financially-Integrated World : Lessons from East Asia's R~ent Eltpcrience". 
World Bank. mimeo. November. 
Bank of I nt~mational Settlements (1995). Amlllaf Ht'IHJrt, 
Bhagwau, 1. (l998a). 'The Capital Myth:' Foreigll Affairs. Vol. 77. March-April. 
Bhigw3ti. J. (1998b). An Interview wi th Far Elmt'rll Economic Hi' l·iell'. October 15. 
Browne. L .. R. Hellerstein. and 1. Little. " Innatlon. Asset Markets. and Economic Stabilization: 
lessons from Asia." N~w EIIsland Ecollomic R~I'iell'. Federdl Reserve Bank of Boston. 
September/October. pp. 3·32. 
BUSlelo. P. (1998) "The East Asian Financial eri"is: An Analytical Survey:' ICEI Working Paper. 
October. 
Cal\·o. G. and M. Goldstein (1995). "Crisis Prevention and Cri"is Managemcnt after Mexico." Pa-
per presented at the Conference on Private Capital Flows afte r the Meltican Crisis. Institute 
for International Economics. September. 
Claessens. S. and T. Glaessner ( 1997). "Arc Financial SeclOr Weaknesses Undcnnining the East 
Asian Mimc1e?" Direcliolls ill Del'e/opmem. World Bank. Scptember. 
Dornbusch. R. (1998). "Asian Crisis: Themes". MassachusellS Institute of T~hnology. mimoo. 
COfSelli. G .. P. Pesenti and N. Roubini ( 1998). "Whnt Caused the Asian Currency and Financial 
CrisisT' mimeo. September. 
Eggleston, K. ( 1997). 'The. SUlotainabililY of Easl Asian Growth:' Asel/ll EC()l romic Bulleti". Vol. 
14, No. 1. July. pp. 14·32. 
Feldstein, M. (1998). "Refocusing the IMF." Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77. March/Apri l. pp. 20·33, 
fiSCher. S. ( 1997). ''Capital Accounl Liberali7.ation and the Role of the IMF." International Mone-
tary Fund . 19 Septernber. 
Fischer. S. ( 1998). 'The Asinn Crisis: A View from the IMF." International MonetaI)' Fund. 22 
January. 
Frankel. 1. and A. Rose (1996). "Currency Crashes in Emerging Markets: An Empirical Treat· 
menl." JOllrnal of IlIternatiOlw/ Economic:.'. Vol. 41 , No. 3/4. pp. 35 1-66. 
Goldfajn, I. and T. Baig (1998). "~'Ione t:uy Po licy in the Aftennath of Currency Crises: The Case 
of Asia:' International Monetnry Fund. mimeo. October. 
106 
107 
Goldstein, M. (1998), 'The Asian Financial Crisis:' Imernational EcononUcs Policy Briefs, 11lStl. 
tute for Imernational Economics, Washington, D. C .• March. 
Griffith-Jones, S. ( 1997), "Causes and Lessons of the Mexican Peso Crisis," WIDER Working Pa. 
per No. 132, May. 
Griffith-Jones. S. ( 1998a). " How to Protect Developing Countries from Volatility of CapJtaI 
Aows?" Expen Group Meeting. Commonwealth Secretariat, July. 
Griffith-Jones. S. (1998b), 'The East Asian Financial Crisis: A Reflection on its Causes, COIN. 
quences and Policy Implications," IDS Discussion Paper 367, Sussex. 
Griffith-Jones, S. and S. Pfaffenzeller ( 1998), 'The EaSt Asian Currency Crisis: A Survey of the 
Debate on its C:IUseS and Possible Solutions." Institute of Development Studies. 18 June. 
International Monetary Fund ( 1995), /lIternlltiona/ Capital Markt!u: De,,~/opmenu, Prosp«tJand 
Policy Isslles, (eds.) D. Folkens Landau and T. Ito, August. 
International Monetary Fund (1997). World Economic Ollilook.lm~rim AssesS~nI. Washington. OC. 
International Monetary Fund (1998), World Economic OUllook. October, Washington OC. 
Islam. A. (1998), ''The Dynamics of the Asian Economic Crisis and Several Policy I mplications.~ 
DESA-ESCAP, Bangkok, July. 
Johnston. R .. S. Darber and L. Echeverria (1997), "Sequential Capital Account Liber.l1ization: 
Lessons from the Experiences in Chile, Indonesia, Korea. and Thailand:' IMF Working Pa. 
per WP/97/J57. 
Kaminsky, G. and C. Reinhart (1997). 'The Twin Crises: The Causes of Banking and BaJanct-of. 
Paymenrs Problems,'" Mimoo. Federal Reserve BOard. Washington. DC. 
Krugman, P. (1994), ''The Myth of Asia's Miracle," Foreigll Affairs, Vol. 73, No.6. NO\'emberl 
December, pp. 62-78. 
Krugman. P. (l998a). '"Will Asia Bounce Back'!" Speech given to the Credit Suisse First BosI:on. 
Hong Kong, March. 
Krugman. P. (l998b). "Saving Asia: Its time to get Radical:' Fortlm~, September 7. 
Krugman. P. (I 998c), "What happened to Asia'!", mimoo, Massachusetts Lnstitute ofT«hnology. 
Cambridge, MA. 
Lcipzigcr, D. and V. Thomas (1994). "Roots of East Asia's Success." FjflaflC~ and Delyfopm~nI. 
Vol. 31. No. I , pp. 6.9. 
Liu. L., M. Noland S Robinson and Z Won (1998) "A' C . .. 
' • '. u g ,Sinn ompetitiveness Devaluations. 
-Institute for Internatio nal Economics. Work ing Papcr 98-2. 
Montes. M. ( 1998). "The Southeast Asian Cu rrency Crisis:' in Shorl Term C{lpital Movements lIlId 
Balanct' of PO),IIIellls Crius. fonhcoming. Oxford University Press, Oxford . 
Moreno. R. ( 1998) "Respond ing to Asia's C ri <>cs:' Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Eco-
l10mic utter. No. 98·33. November 6. 
Naslllion. A. ( 1996) "The Banking Syste m and Monetary Aggregates Following Financial Sector 
Refonns: Lessons from Indones;:I," Research fo r Act io n #27. WIDER. Helsinki. 
Noland. M. (1998). "The Financ ial Crisis in Asia," S tatement before lhe House Internmional Rela-
tions Committee. Subcom mittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs. February 3. 
Page. J. ( 1994). "The East Asian Miracle:' FinaCt' (llIli DCI'e!opment. Vol. 3 1. No. I. March. pp. 
2-5. 
Park. Y. c. (l996), "East Asian Libemlizatio n. Bubbles. and the Chalie nges from China." Brook-
ings PlJpers Oil Economic ACl i!";t.\', (2). 
Radelel. S. and J. Sachs (1998a). ' 'The Onset of the Ea.st Asian Financial Cri sis:' mimeo. Harvard 
Institute for !ntematio nal Development, Marc h. 
Radelct. S. and J . Sachs ( 1998b). "The East Asian Financial Crisis: Diagnosis. Remedies. Pros-
pects:' mimeo. Harvard Institute fo r Internatio nal Developmcnt. May. 
Ramos, R. (1997). "Asian Banks at Risk: Solidity. Fragility:' Banking Research. Goldman Sachs. 
September. 
Reisen. H. (1997) "Sustainable and E",cessivc Current Account Deficits:' WIDER Working Paper 
No. 133. May. 
Reisen. H. ( 1998) "Domestic Causes of Currency Crises: Policy Lessons for Cri sis Avoidance:' 
DECO Development Cen tre. Tec hnical Paper No. 136. June. 
Rodrik. D. (1998). "Who Needs Capital Account ConvertibilityT Harvard Universi ty, mimco. 
Stiglitz. 1. (1996) "Some Lessons from the East Asian Miracle:' The World Balik Research Ob-
sm'u. Vol. II . No.2. pp. 151-177. 
Stiglitz. 1. ( 1998). '· Boats. Planes and Capital FloWS:' Fi"allcial Times. 25 March, pp. 32. 
. G . / d PI bile Policy Oxford Un i-
World Bank (1993). The £os/ Asia" Miracle: Ecollomlc roll I I {III' ' 
\'ersity Press. New York. NY. 
Young. A. ( 1995). ' 'The Tyranny of Numbers: Confronting the Statistical Realitie5so0f the Ea.st 
.. I J l o'Ecollomics Vol. 110. pp. 64 1- . 
Asian Growth Experience. Quarter .\' ollrna 'J • 
• 
108 
